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This paper examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to a wide array 
of “news” reported in the financial press.  A number of previous studies have shown that 
in order to find significant reactions in the foreign exchange market to the 
macroeconomic variables that theory suggests should matter, one needs to measure the 
precise impact of macro surprises at the intra-day level.  While these studies provide 
evidence that macro news influences both returns and volatility, because these 
announcements occur very infrequently (typically once a month or quarter) they cannot 
go far in explaining the bulk of foreign exchange rate movements.  In this paper, we ask 
whether a much broader definition of “news” influences currency values and ought to be 
included in our models of exchange rate determination.  Using Reuters’ time-stamped 
newswire reports, we include all news stories that provide information relevant to foreign 
exchange markets. The stories are then classified by information source (policymaker or 
market participant), geographic region (Euro zone, Japan, U.S. or U.K.) and substance 
(both actual events and rumors involving fundamentals and non-fundamentals).  Our 
“news” data include the scheduled macro announcements that have been used in previous 
studies to allow us to compare the effects of our broader definition of news against these 
more “traditional” variables.    
The intra-day foreign exchange data used in this study are transactions prices and 
quote spreads in the USD-EUR and USD-GBP market from the Reuters D2000-2 
electronic trading system.  The data do not include information on traded quantities, but 
they do indicate whether trades were initiated by a buyer or seller, allowing us to measure 
order flow as well as returns and volatility.  We use a 20 minute sampling frequency for 
each exchange rate and we measure order flow as the cumulative number of buyer 
initiated trades minus the cumulative number of seller initiated trades over the same 20 
minutes. 
These data allow us to test a number of interesting hypotheses.  First, we test 
whether non-scheduled “news” of different sorts has similar impact effects on returns and 
volatility as compared to (the already heavily studied) scheduled macro announcements.  
Theory suggests that ambiguous information may lead to stronger differences of opinion 
about the implications of the information (and, in turn, larger increases in volatility).  In 
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our application, we can distinguish between scheduled (and presumably better-
understood) macro announcements and more ambiguous news (for example, market 
rumors of impending interest rate changes). Second, we test whether news that is 
typically not considered “fundamental” in the context of standard models of exchange 
rate determination (for example, news related to technical analysis), helps to explain 
exchange rate movements.  Third, we examine whether any of the price discovery 
process in reaction to news occurs via order flow.  Previous studies have found evidence 
that a substantial proportion of the market reaction to macro-announcements occurs via 
order flow.  By examining how a broader set of news events influences order flow – we 
can begin to better understand how this measure relates to price and volatility movements 
in the foreign exchange markets. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the links between 
macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates in standard models, the lack of 
empirical support for these links, and alternative modeling strategies that may improve 
our understanding of what drives exchange rate movements.  Section 3 describes the 
exchange rate and order flow data from Reuters D2000-2 used in our empirical analysis.  
Section 4 provides results of our event study analysis of the influence of our broader 
definition of news on exchange rate returns and volatility.  Section 5 introduces our order 
flow information and examines its role in explaining exchange rate movements.  Section 
6 examines the influence of news on returns and order flow simultaneously in the context 
of a VAR analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  News and Exchange Rates 
The asset approach to exchange rate determination suggests that exchange rates 
are forward looking asset prices that react to changes in the market’s expectation of 
future fundamentals. Empirical tests of the asset approach examine in various ways 
whether changes in the macroeconomic variables that are considered fundamentals 
explain exchange rate movements.1  These tests generally find that macroeconomic 
variables, which tend to have fairly stable time series properties, can explain little of the 
                                                 
1 Examples of “fundamentals” include: income (or output) differentials, money differentials, interest rate 
differentials, inflation differentials and the trade balance. 
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(sometimes dramatic) variation in exchange rate movements.  This line of research is best 
summarized by a series of papers by Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b) which find that 
forecasts of exchange rates based on a random walk model of exchange rate 
determination do better than forecasts that are based on macro-economic models.2
In the wake of the Meese and Rogoff papers3, one branch of empirical research 
has focused on the possibility that their result was more a function of estimation 
imprecision than an indictment of the asset approach.4  If the window of time around the 
shock to fundamentals is too wide, other news hitting the market will confound the 
econometrician’s ability to precisely estimate the effects of the change in fundamentals 
on exchange rates.  One solution is to use intra-daily exchange rate data that will allow a 
narrow enough window around the time of macro announcements to be able to set up a 
natural experiment. A number of papers, including Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and 
Vega (2003), find that when a narrow window is used, they are able to find a strong 
relationship between certain macro-surprises and exchange rate returns.5  An alternative 
approach is taken by Fair (2003) who identifies large intra-day changes in exchange rates 
(and stock and bond prices) over the period 1982 through 1999 and then looks for “news” 
that hit markets around the large changes to connect exchange rates movements to 
changes in macro fundamentals. 
This paper takes the results in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) as 
a benchmark, and asks three important follow-on questions.  First, are the traditional sets 
                                                 
2 Engel and West (2005) provide an explanation for the Meese-Rogoff result based on the present value 
relationship that follows from the asset approach. They show that if the discount factor is near one, 
exchange rates will be largely driven by expected fundamentals far out into the future, which will be 
dominated by their random walk component.  Other studies that re-examine the Meese-Rogoff result for 
long-horizon forecasts include Mark (1995), Kilian (1999), and Kilian and Taylor (2003). 
3 A number of researchers have re-investigated the original Meese and Rogoff (1983ab) result and have 
generally found it to be robust.  See, for example, Flood and Rose (1995) and Cheung, Chinn and Pascual 
(2005). 
4 An alternative approach assumes that the underlying reason for the Meese-Rogoff result is that the foreign 
exchange market is either not efficient, or that market participants are not rational.  The fact that many 
foreign exchange traders follow technical trading rules that are unrelated to the types of variables found in 
standard exchange rate determination models provides suggestive evidence that this approach may have 
some merit.  See Osler (2003) for an example of this approach. 
5 The enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily exchange rates includes 
Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee (1995), DeGennaro and Shrieves 
(1997), Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Melvin and Yin (2000), 
Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003), Love and Payne (2003), Love (2004), Chaboud, Chernenko, 
Howorka, Iyer, Liu and Wright (2004) and Bauwens, Ben Omrane and Giot (2005).  
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of macro surprises that most of the literature considers the only sorts of news that can 
explain exchange rate movements?  We examine the intra-daily influence of a broad set 
of news reports, including variables which are not typically considered “fundamentals” in 
the context of standard models of exchange rate determination, and ask whether they too 
help explain exchange rate movements.6 If we find that non-fundamental variables 
matter, the “positive” results that many researchers have found for the influence of macro 
announcements on exchange rates at intra-daily frequencies may need to be re-
interpreted.  If all sorts of news influence exchange rates, the “narrow window” 
explanation for why low frequency empirical tests of standard models are inappropriate, 
is no longer sufficient.  Or, put another way, we are back again to the Meese-Rogoff 
result that it is not macro-fundamentals that best predict exchange rate behavior.  Second, 
we ask whether using a broader definition of news, we are able to explain a significant 
portion of the overall variation of exchange rate movements.  Macro-announcements 
occur relatively infrequently, so that even if they explain 100% of the short-term 
movements in exchange rates, this translates into explaining less than 1% of overall 
exchange rate movements.  The third question we consider is whether “news” not only 
impacts exchange rates directly, but also influences exchange rates via order flow (signed 
trade volume).  Like non-fundamental news, order flow plays no role in standard models 
of exchange rate determination, so a finding that order flow matters will provide evidence 
in favor of a different modeling strategy for exchange rate determination (at least for very 
short term movements).7
There are a number of reasons for questioning whether macro announcements are 
the best real-time source of information on fundamentals.  First, macro announcements 
are retrospective, in the sense that they provide information about past changes in 
variables.  Second, announcements are often revised substantially so that the first (or 
preliminary) report is not necessarily a good indication of the true (or final) report.  When 
macro announcements are used in empirical studies they are generally measured relative 
                                                 
6 A number of papers have considered the influence of central bank interventions and official policy 
statements on exchange rates. These papers include: Dominguez (1998, 2003, forthcoming), Cai, Cheung, 
Lee and Melvin (2001), Evans and Lyons (2003), Fatum and Hutchison (2003), Fratzscher (2004), Panthaki 
(2004), Sager and Taylor (2004), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) and Jansen and De Haan (2005). 
7 Evans and Lyons (2002) is one of the first studies that found a link between order flow and exchange rate 
movements. We will be examining these same links though with a very different data set and time period. 
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to market expectations.  Money Market Services International’s median survey responses 
are used to calculate the “surprise” component, based on the assumption that market 
participants (and survey participants) are rational and the foreign exchange market is 
efficient, so that only unexpected news matters.  There are a number of reasons to be 
skeptical that the median survey response accurately reflects market expectations.8  So 
that both the announcements and the proxy used to measure the expectation of the 
announcements may be noisy indicators of actual macro surprises.9
In practice, dealers in the foreign exchange market receive information from 
numerous different sources, including their own customers, electronic brokerage systems, 
squawk boxes, and newswire services. Newswire services report the macro 
announcements described previously along with various other sorts of news which 
sometimes are also directly related to macro fundamentals.  One of the major distinctions 
that can be made between macro announcements and other news is that the 
announcements are typically made on a schedule, so that market participants can plan 
their reactions in advance (depending on realizations).  Non-scheduled news is by its 
nature less likely to be anticipated by the market.  It may also be the case that market 
participants are less able to quickly interpret the implications of non-scheduled news for 
exchange rates, potentially leading to more heterogeneity in their responses to the news.10
Whether news is scheduled or non-scheduled its influence on exchange rates may 
be related to the state of the market at the time of the news arrival.11  News that arrives 
during periods of high uncertainty may have different effects on the exchange rate, than 
                                                 
8 For example, the median survey participant may not be representative of “market” opinion, or survey 
participants may have strategic reasons not to reveal their true expectation. 
9 Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu and Wright (2004) and Laakkonen (2004) find that even if there 
is no macro surprise (so that the expectation exactly matches the announcement) volatility (and trading 
volume) tends to rise after the release of the (unsurprising) announcement.  These results could either be 
interpreted as suggesting our measure of macro surprise is flawed, or that market reactions to news do not 
conform to our standard models. 
10 Of course, an increase in market heterogeneity may also occur in reaction to scheduled announcements.  
Kondor (2004) shows that if traders display confirmatory bias, the release of public information may 
increase divergence in opinion.  The main insight is that sometimes (public) information implies something 
different when it is coupled with different (private) pieces of existing information.  Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop (2003) also model the influence of higher-order expectations in reaction to news. 
11 For example, Dominguez (2003) shows that the influence of central bank interventions on exchange rate 
returns depends on the intra-day timing of intervention operations (whether they occur during heavy trading 
volume, or are closely timed to scheduled macro announcements) as well as whether the operations are 
coordinated with another central bank. 
 5
news that arrives in calmer periods.12  It may also be the case that the frequency of news 
arrival itself will influence the relative importance of individual news releases.13   
In this paper we allow for the possibility that exchange rates react to a wide 
spectrum of “news”, including, but not exclusively, macro announcements.  We also 
allow for the possibility that information on the “state of the market” will influence the 
way that news influences exchange rates.  Finally, we allow for the possibility that the 
trading process itself serves to convey information to the market via order flow. 
One way to think about why order flow might matter is suggested in the Kyle 
(1985) model which focuses on the strategic aspects of informed trading in a market 
microstructure model. Informed traders in Kyle’s model can be thought of as information 
monopolists who act to exploit this advantage by maximizing the value of private 
information. In the model, Kyle introduces the concept of a price impact coefficient 
which reflects how much the market adjusts prices to reflect the information content of 
trades. The model suggests that since the more liquid a market, the less individual trades 
will impact price, informed traders will prefer to “hide” their private information by 
trading during periods of high liquidity.  In this context private information will 
eventually become known (and be reflected in price) but the process of information 
revelation takes place gradually via order flow.  Standard exchange rate models give no 
role to private information (or order flow) because the assumption is that the sorts of 
information that matter, macro fundamentals, are common knowledge and are 
incorporated into price instantaneously. 
An alternative view is that individual traders are not “informed” in the sense that 
they have a better understanding of future market movements than other traders, but that 
their own trading motives (based on real trade, profit repatriation, speculation, portfolio 
rebalancing) may be correlated with other traders, eventually leading to aggregate 
changes in fundamentals.  In this context, dealers who have information about order flow 
                                                 
12 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) find evidence that “bad” news in good times (economic 
expansions) have greater impacts than good news in good times, suggesting that good news in good times 
confirms beliefs but bad news in good times comes as more of a surprise.  Our short sample period will not 
allow us to test this hypothesis directly, though in future work we intend to test whether “confirming” 
versus “surprising” news have different effects. 
13 A dramatic example of this occurred during the period in late 1995 when the US government was shut 
down and macro announcements went unreported.  During this period traders apparently reacted to “news” 
(such as the shoe manufacturer’s monthly sales survey) which in normal periods have little influence. 
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may learn about fundamentals before they are officially announced. Evans and Lyons 
(2004) test this proposition using a data set that allows them to disaggregate order flow 
among various end-user segments (non-financial corporations, investors, leveraged 
traders); they find evidence that order flow information forecasts macro fundamentals. 
We are not able to directly measure the “private” information available to 
individual dealers, but we have collected a relatively rich measure of public (time-
stamped) news from Reuters’s newswire reports14 as well as the order flow information 
available from Reuters D2000-2. We use these two sources of “common knowledge” 
news, as well as the macro announcements typically used in the literature, to test some 
intra-daily implications of standard exchange rate models. 
Tables 1 through 3 provide information about: (1) the scheduled macro news 
announcements from the UK, the US, and the Euro-zone, (2) the broad categories of non-
scheduled fundamental news, and (3) the broad categories of non-scheduled non-
fundamental news that we include in our empirical analysis.  Our news variables were 
created using a search criteria which retrieved newswire articles under the broad subject 
areas of “money”, “foreign exchange” and “economics” over the period 15 November 
1999 through 18 January 2000.   We excluded all re-published news, recurring price and 
market data, articles covering obituaries, sports, calendars of events, letters, diaries, 
weather, cooking and personal announcements.  We then coded and grouped15 news 
articles according to source (policymaker or market participant), geographic region 
(Euro-zone, U.S. or Japan) and substance (related to fundamentals or non-fundamentals).  
On average there were 4 news items per day so that approximately 5% of our 72 20-
minute return intervals per day include a news report.  Approximately 65% of these news 
reports were categorized as related to ‘fundamentals’, while 35% were coded as non-
fundamental news. 
 News that we code as “non-scheduled non-fundamental” largely falls into six 
main sub-categories.  The first four categories: the options market, technical analysis, 
                                                 
14 These data are from the Factiva database and, unfortunately, do not include the headline news that run 
over the Reuters and Bloomberg ticker second by second, but they include the major economic news events 
that occur over a given day. 
15 In theory each “news” report may have a different one-time influence on exchange rates.  We group 
similar news items together in order to examine whether certain “types” of news have a systematic 
influence on exchange rate behavior.   
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market characteristics and market sentiment, are all related specifically to the foreign 
exchange market, and are often based on interviews with or quotes from market 
participants who trade based on “technical” rather than “fundamental” information16.  
Our non-fundamental news also includes news related to the private sector (often focused 
on restructuring, and mergers and acquisitions), and politics.  While it is possible that 
some of this news is indirectly related to fundamentals (when firms restructure they may 
improve profitability, and, in turn this may lead to higher country-level growth) our sense 
is that these sorts of news reports do not fit the traditional definition of “fundamentals”.  
It is also likely that there is more heterogeneity in market participant’s interpretations of 
the importance of this sort of news relative to, for example, scheduled macro 
announcements.  In any case, given that a significant portion of newswire reports fall into 
this category of non-scheduled non-fundamental news, it seems worth examining whether 
their influence on exchange rates differs from fundamentals related news. 
 
3. Exchange Market Data 
Our intra-day exchange rate and order flow data cover a ten-month period, from 
06 Oct 1999 through 24 July 2000 for the USD-EUR and USD-GBP.17  The data are from 
the brokered segment of the inter-dealer exchange rate market as captured by the Reuters 
D2000-2 electronic trading system.18  Electronic brokers were first introduced in 1992 
and since that time their market share has increased rapidly. In the early 1990s the inter-
dealer market was split evenly between direct and voice-broker trading but by the late 
                                                 
16 For example here are some quotes from market participants: “Price action today was dictated by 
technical factors, options related factors”; “Dealers said the euro would likely struggle to break key 
technical levels near $1.0350”; “Analysts said only a breach of key chart resistance located around $1.03 
could give an incentive to market bulls for betting on the euro”; “Liquidity is still pretty poor... but it is a 
market that is moving as more people get sucked in, so inevitably momentum can build up and we can get a 
reasonably sharp move”. 
17  EBS, the other major electronic brokerage system, has a much larger share of total trading in the USD-
EUR market potentially leading the Reuters data for the USD-EUR to be less representative.  Reuters USD-
EUR order flow data, in particular, may not well capture average trading behavior in that market outside of 
European hours.  Reuters dominates EBS in the USD-GBP market. 
18 See Rime (2003) for a detailed description of electronic trading systems and Lyons (2001, chapter 3) for 
a full description of the three basic types of trades in the foreign exchange market.  Direct inter-dealer 
trading was traditionally the most liquid part of the foreign exchange market – it typically is used for large 
size trades (above $10 million) and spreads are typically only one to two basis points.  Brokered inter-
dealer trades are a growing segment of the market, and typically involve slightly higher spreads of 2-3 basis 
points (especially for trades below $10 million).  Customer-dealer trades involve 3-7 basis point spreads for 
“good” customers.   
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1990s the two top electronic brokerage systems, Reuters and EBS, made up over 50 
percent of the market.  
Inter-dealer brokering systems provide prices that are advertised to all member 
dealers (though the identity of the quoting dealer is only available once the quote is hit).  
Dealers can submit a buy or sell quote or “hit” a quote of another dealer. Only the highest 
bid and lowest ask (the touch) are shown on the Reuters screen.19  The quantity available 
at each (best) bid and ask is also shown (which may involve more than one bank), and 
when a bid or ask is hit the quantities available at that price are adjusted if they dip below 
$10 million. When multiple banks have entered the same bid or ask price, and the price is 
hit, offers are met on a first come basis (meaning that the dealer who first input the price 
gets the deal first and if more quantity is needed, the dealer that next submitted the same 
price fills the order, and so on).  All transactions are made at either the posted bid or 
ask.20 Table 4 provides a snap-shot (from Rime (2003)) of what the Reuters D2000-2 
screen might look like to a dealer at a point in time.  Figure 1 shows bid and ask quotes 
for the USD-EUR and USD-GBP rates over our sample period along with the quote mid-
point  It is worth noting that the USD-GBP rate was relatively stable over this sample 
period, with a fluctuation range of between 1.47 and 1.68.  The USD-EUR rate was 
roughly twice as variable, with trades ranging from 0.82 to 1.26. 
While dealers in individual banks will know their own customer order flow – they 
do not have access to information on customer orders of other banks.  One of the reasons 
that inter-dealer brokerage systems have become so popular is that they provide an 
important source of real time information on both market quotes and overall market order 
flow.  The Reuters D2000-2 system classifies transactions as buyer-initiated or seller-
initiated, providing dealers with a real time proxy of signed trading volume.21  We 
measure order flow in this study as the difference between the number of buyer-initiated 
trades and seller-initiated trades in each 20-minute interval.  Figure 2 shows the number 
                                                 
19 Limit orders with prices below the best bid or above the best offer are not observable on Reuters D2000-
2 but are shown on Minex. 
20 One advantage of the (shrinking) voice-brokered market is that it allows for some communication 
between dealers and brokers which allows for negotiation over price. 
21 The dealer posting the quote is considered the non-initiating side.  Reuters does not provide information 
on the size of each trade. 
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of buy and sell orders separately as well as our measure of order flow for the USD-EUR 
and USD-GBP rates. 
The intra-day price series used in this study incorporates information from both 
transactions prices (actual trades) and (tradeable) bid and ask quotes submitted by dealers 
(but not hit).22  We use tradeable quotes in addition to actual transactions prices to create 
a 20-minute price series for each of our two exchange rates that spans the period over 
which we have “news” data.23  We measure exchange rate returns, tis∆ , as the log 
difference in 20-minute (midpoint) prices and exchange rate volatility, as the absolute 
value of the 20-minute returns.  Figure 3 shows USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns and 
volatility over our sample period.  The volatility series displays the strong seasonal 
pattern that is typically found in intra-day exchange rate volatility data which, in turn, 
largely reflects the opening and closing of the three main trading markets in Tokyo, 
Europe and New York. We de-seasonalize the volatility series using the Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1997ab, 1998) flexible fourier form (FFF) regression method which involves 
decomposing the demeaned i-minute exchange rate returns, into a daily volatility factor, a 
periodic component for the i
tiV
th intraday interval and an i.i.d. mean zero unit variance 
innovation term all divided by the square root of the number of uncorrelated intraday 
return components.24  Figure 4 shows the average absolute USD-EUR and USD-GBP 
return in each 20-minute interval over the 24-hour GMT time scale along side the 
estimated FFF seasonal.  Figure 5 shows average daily USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns, 
order flow and news arrival also over the 24-hour GMT time scale.  It is worth noting that 
news arrival is fairly evenly spread over the day, while order flow for the USD-EUR 
market is relatively light outside of European trading hours, presumably reflecting that 
EBS holds a dominant share of trading volume in that market.  There is little evidence of 
a within day trend in average returns for either exchange rate. 
                                                 
22 Tradeable quotes differ from indicative quotes, which have been used in a number of previous studies, in 
that they provide “firm” prices.  Indicative quotes provide market information for non-dealers. 
23 There are a periods of low liquidity on Reuters D2000-2 due to technical problems (the feed failing), 
holidays, and during Asian trading hours.  Some studies simply drop these time periods from the sample. 
Our approach is to interpolate a 20 minute time series (using a piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating 
function which preserves the monotonicity and shape of the data) from all available quotes in order to fully 
span our “news” data set.  Reuters does not include weekend data so any news that arrives over a weekend 
is moved to the first 20-minute interval on the nearest Monday. 
24 See Dominguez (forthcoming) for a detailed description of how this was implemented. 
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Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for our 20-minute USD-EUR and usd-gbp 
exchange rates, returns25 and volatility, order flow and order flow volatility, and 
transaction frequency (measured as the number of transactions in a given 20-minute 
interval). The USD-EUR exchange rate returns series only display first-order 
autocorrelation, suggesting that future exchange rate changes cannot be predicted from 
past changes beyond a 20 minute horizon. There is no evidence of autocorrelation for the 
USD-GBP returns.  Intra-day return volatility and transaction frequency for both 
currencies shows evidence of strong and persistent autocorrelation. While buy and sell 
orders are highly autocorrelated, order-flow (buy orders minus sell orders) does not 
display significant autocorrelation for either currency. 
Table 6 presents contemporaneous correlations among our key variables: 
exchange rate returns and volatility, order flow and order flow volatility as well as a 
measure of news arrival (measured as the number of news articles in a given 20-minute 
interval) and trading frequency.26  The correlations indicate that there exists a strong 
contemporaneous association between exchange rate returns and order flow and order 
flow volatility and transaction frequency for both currencies.  For the USD-GBP rate the 
correlations between exchange rate volatility, order flow volatility, and transaction 
frequency are also high. Beyond these contemporaneous correlations, we might expect 
longer-lived correlation between news and the other variables if traders have different 
views of the implications (and information content) of the news. 
 
4. Effects of Different Categories of  News on Returns and Volatility 
The standard approach in the empirical exchange rate literature is to run the 
following sort of “event study” style regression27 of the conditional mean of  i-minute 
                                                 
25 We compute returns (approximately) as the percentage change in the exchange rate multiplied by 100, so 
the units can be thought of as basis points. 
26 Evans and Lyons (2003) document strong contemporaneous correlation between news arrival, transaction 
frequency and order flow volatility.  Melvin and Yin (2000) find a positive correlation between trading 
frequency (using indicative quotes) and the rate of flow of public information. 
27 An alternative approach based on state dependent heteroscedasticity is used by Rigabon and Sack (2002) 
and Evans and Lyons (2003). 
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exchange rate returns, ,  on j leadstis∆
28 and lags of each of the k “news” announcements 
and g lags of past returns (to account for the autocorrelation we found in table 5); that is: 
2,i i j
k k
0 1, jk j g gt t  =  +  + s N α i g it tsα α − − ε+∑ ∑ ∑∆ ∆     (1) 
where denotes the change in the natural log of the i-minute (spot market) exchange rate 
on day t and N denotes the (time-stamped to the nearest i-minute) “news”
tis∆
29.  We use the 
Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix the lag length on returns and the lead/lag length on “news”, 
and we correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term using the 
Newey and West (1987) approach. Using this general regression specification it is possible 
to test for the impact and intra-day effects of news on exchange rate returns by examining 
whether the Nks are individually and jointly statistically significant. The 1,
k
jα s in this 
context measure the typical effect of the kth news announcement at time j (on day t) on 
exchange rate returns in the same (narrow) 20-minute window.  It is worth noting that in 
order to be able to interpret the 1,
k
jα s in this way we need to assume that the variables in the 
regression can be viewed as fixed over the 20-minute period (which is less likely to be 
realistic for low-frequency data windows).  It is also the case that the 1,
k
jα s will measure the 
linear combination of exchange rate return effects associated with the market’s assessment 
of both the “news” and how the news will influence the economy.30
 Our “news” variable includes three distinct categories of news: (1) scheduled macro 
surprises, (2) non-scheduled but fundamentals-driven news, and (3) non-scheduled non-
fundamental based news. Within categories (2) and (3) news was further broken down by 
source (policy-maker or market participant), geographic region (Euro-zone, Japan, US or 
UK), substance (subcategories of  fundamentals and non-fundamentals) and expected 
direction of influence (whether the news is expected to appreciate or depreciate the 
                                                 
28 We include leads in order to take into account the possibility that the time-stamp on our “news” lags the 
actual timing of when market participants first learn about the news. We find evidence of significant lead 
effects for many of our variables for up to two hours prior to the Reuters’ time-stamp. 
29 The Reuters news variables are (0,1) dummy variables.  The macro surprises are measured as the 
difference between the specific announcement and the ex-ante expectation of the announcement (based on 
the median response to a survey conducted by Money Market Services International) divided by the sample 
standard deviation of each announcement (this serves to normalize the surprises so that comparisons of the 
relative size of coefficients is feasible). 
30 For a nice discussion of the underlying assumptions in this sort of event study analysis see Faust, Rogers, 
Wand and Wright (2003) pages 6-9. 
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exchange rate)31.  Category (2) and (3) news are in binary dummy variable form which is 
likely to downward bias our results if these sorts of news are sometimes anticipated by the 
market.  
Table 7 presents results of our regression of USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns on 
various categories of “news”.  The first and third columns in table 7 present the results of 
our benchmark regression which include only the macro surprises as “news” for the 
USD-EUR (first column) and USD-GBP (third column).  As has been found in previous 
studies, the macro surprises significantly influence both USD-EUR and USD-GBP 
returns, though the relatively low regression goodness-of-fit  (especially for the USD-
GBP) suggests that macro surprises account for a small fraction of the overall variability 
of returns.32  The second and fourth columns in table 7 present results of regressions that 
include our broader definition of news.  These columns include, along with the macro 
surprises, non-scheduled news reports that are related to fundamentals and news that is 
not related to fundamentals. In the usd-euro regressions Euro-zone macro surprises are 
only statistically significant when other “news” is not included (first column).  For the 
USD-GBP regressions both UK and Euro-zone macro surprises matter, even when other 
“news” is included (third and fourth column). US macro surprises did not enter 
significantly in any of the regressions. 
Looking first at the influence of non-scheduled fundamentals, we find that a 
number of these “news” reports matter in terms of statistical significance.  The first 
variable that shows up significant in the USD-EUR regression is contemporaneous 
“Euro-zone monetary fundamentals” with a coefficient of -0.02, which can be interpreted 
as indicating that these news reports (which tended to mention Euro-zone interest rates or 
inflation) led to a 2 basis point appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro.  It is 
                                                 
31 We attempted to group news into variables in such a way as to insure that we would not be combining 
news that would be expected to lead to opposite effects on exchange rates.  The coefficients on these 
disaggregated news variables are then aggregated into broader groupings of variables (monetary 
fundamentals, fiscal fundamentals, growth and unemployment, options market, technical analysis, private 
sector) in order to keep our tables readable.   Regression results with the disaggregated news categories are 
available upon request. 
32 The macro surprises are disaggregated by region (so that all U.S. surprises are included as one variable).  
As robustness checks we also included disaggregated macro surprises (by type and region, e.g. US PPI, 
etc…) as well as aggregating the surprises (all US, UK and European surprises included as one variable).  
Results were qualitatively similar across the three levels of aggregation.  The non-reported results 
(disaggregated by type and region, and fully aggregated) are available upon request. 
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interesting to note that reports of Japanese interventions (which were aimed at weakening 
the yen over this time period)33 led to a contemporaneous 3.8 basis point appreciation of 
the dollar relative to the euro and a similar size influence on the dollar relative to the 
pound (though in the 20 minutes prior to the Reuters time-stamp).   Focusing next on the 
influence of non-fundamentals related news, we find evidence that reports connected to 
all our included categories (option market, technical analysis, sentiment, private sector 
and politics) enter significantly.  Moreover, the coefficient estimates on non-fundamental 
news are similar in size to those found for fundamentals-related news. We also find 
strong evidence of both lead (especially for the USD-GBP)34 and lag effects on the non-
scheduled news variables, suggesting both that some traders learn of the news before our 
Reuters’ time-stamp and that market reaction to “news” is often not instantaneous. 
The results in table 7 indicate that both scheduled macro surprises and non-
scheduled fundamental and non-fundamental news influences returns.  In order to further 
examine how information is processed by the market under different market conditions, 
we test for two types of interaction effects.  First, we ask whether news is more (or less) 
likely to influence returns during periods when lots of other news is hitting the market.  
We create an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 during 20-minute intervals when 
the number of news reports exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations.  The 
first two columns of table 8 suggest that for both USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns 
“news” often had a larger impact on returns when it arrived during heavy news periods.  
Our results are even more dramatic when we test whether news has a stronger impact 
during periods of high market uncertainty (proxied by high volatility).  We create an 
indicator variable that takes on the value 1 during 20-minute intervals when volatility 
(measured as the absolute value of returns) exceeds the sample average by two standard 
deviations.  The second two columns in table 8 present regression results that show that 
during periods when the market is most uncertain “news” (of all types) had a significantly 
larger influence on returns than was the case when news arrived during normal periods.   
                                                 
33 The Japanese government intervened on 4 occasions during our sample period, all of these were dollar 
strengthening operations.  A number of unrequited interventions (interventions that the market expected but 
did not occur) also influenced returns over this period.  See Dominguez and Panthaki (2005) for a more 
detailed examination of the influence of actual and unrequited interventions. 
34 One explanation for why lead effects are more important for the USD-GBP market is that the source of 
our data, Reuters, is the dominant player (in terms of market share) in this currency market. 
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The regression results presented in tables 7 and 8 indicate that “news” both 
narrowly defined as macro surprises, and more broadly defined, has an influence on intra-
daily exchange rate returns.  However, the relatively low regression goodness-of-fit 
suggests that even our broader measure of news does not go very far in explaining overall 
exchange rate movements. It is possible that our binary coding of news is partly to blame 
for our inability to explain a larger fraction of exchange rate variation.  It may be that 
while we are not able to “sign” exchange rate movements using such a crude indicator of 
information flow, our “news” variables will be more successful at explaining exchange 
rate volatility. It may also be that news (however measured) does not impact price 
directly, but that its influence is mediated through order flow.  We investigate both these 
possibilities in the next two sets of regressions.   
In order to examine whether our broader definition of news helps to explain the 
absolute value of exchange rate returns, we regress de-seasonalized intra-day volatility, 
s
tiV , on the same set of explanatory “news” variables: 
2,i j i
s k k
0 1, jk j gti g ti gt tV   =  +  + VN λ
s ηλ λ − − +∑ ∑ ∑    (2) 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) find that three factors influence intra-daily 
exchange rate volatility: calendar effects and volatility dependencies (both of which are 
captured in the FFF seasonal) and macro surprises, with macro surprises providing the 
least explanatory power.  We examine the influence of our broader definition of news on 
de-seasonalized35 volatility and allow for a longer lag structure to test whether the effects 
of non-scheduled news reports are longer-lived. We use the Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix 
the leads and lags in the regression specification and correct for potential heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation in the error term using the Newey and West (1987) approach.  
Table 9 presents our volatility regression results using the same column format as 
we did in table 7.  The first thing to note about these results, is that many more of our 
fundamental-related news reports, and especially our non-fundamentals related news 
reports, have a statistically significant effect on de-seasonalized volatility.36 This provides 
                                                 
35 It could be that the intra-day seasonal is explained by news arrival.  We test for this possibility by 
including our news variables directly in the FFF regression and find no evidence of correlation between the 
daily seasonal and our news variables. 
36 It is also worth noting that the regression goodness-of-fit is dramatically higher, due in part to the strong 
AR component of volatility 
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suggestive evidence that non-scheduled news, perhaps because it is more ambiguous, 
leads to stronger differences in opinions about the implications of the information.  None 
of the macro surprises are significant in the USD-EUR regressions, while US macro 
surprises enter with a high degree of statistical significance in the USD-GBP regressions 
both when entered alone and when included with the other “news” variables.   
 
5. What Does Order Flow Reveal? 
In standard models of exchange rate behavior when “positive” news arrives for a 
currency, demand for that currency rises, causing the relative value (the price) of the 
currency to rise.  In these models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to 
news because price is assumed to instantaneously reflect the news.  Trading volume may 
rise in reaction to news, but as long as the new price is efficient, there is no reason for 
these trades to be biased in favor of purchases or sales.  So that in standard models the 
arrival of “news” should increase volume, but be orthogonal to changes in order flow.37
We use transaction frequency, TF, as a proxy for volume, and first test whether 
the arrival of “news” in our sample is positively related to transaction frequency. 
1, 2,i i
k k
t k j j ti j g g ti g t0  =  + N TF + TF γ γγ ν− −∑ ∑ + ∑                           (3) 
We find strong evidence of a positive association between “news” and transaction 
frequency.  Interestingly, macro surprises were sometimes associated with a decrease in 
transactions, while all other “news” (and especially non-fundamental news) generally 
were positively associated with transaction frequency.  In the USD-EUR regression 
macro surprises had no influence on transaction frequency, but other news, and again 
especially non-fundamentals related news, led to increases in transaction frequency. 
Under what circumstance might “news” cause a change not just in volume, but in 
order flow? One reason that price might not immediately (or fully) react is if the “news” 
either is not common knowledge, or if different market participants interpret the news 
differently.  In this case, order flow might convey this information to the market (rather 
                                                 
37 One view of the relationship between order flow and prices is that it is only a temporary phenomenon.  
Order flow in this context reflects trader “digestion effects” in reaction to news, so that once the news is 
fully “digested”, any order flow induced price effects will revert back.  Work by Evans and Lyons (2002) 
and Danielsson, Payne and Luo (2002), however, shows that order flow continues to explain changes in 
foreign exchange returns well after 24 hours, suggesting either that digestion is very slow, or more likely, 
that the influence of order flow on prices is not temporary. 
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than price).  Further, if underlying demand for currencies is driven not by news per se, 
but by changes in risk aversion or hedging technologies, again it might be order flow that 
will convey this information to the market.38
A simple linear regression specification that relates foreign exchange returns to 
order flow is:  
  1, 2,i ij j ti j g gt 0 t  =  + OF + s i gtsβ ββ µ−−∑ +∑∆ ∆     (4) 
Table 10 presents results for a regression of USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns on 
contemporaneous and lagged order flow. The first thing to note in the table is that our 
measure of regression goodness-of-fit is now markedly higher.  Our estimates suggest 
that order flow explains over 25% of the variation in 20-minute USD-GBP returns and 
almost 40% in the USD-EUR market.39  These results are strongly suggestive that order 
flow belongs in our empirical models of exchange rate determination. Indeed, 
Danielsson, Payne and Luo (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2005b) perform Meese-Rogoff 
style RMSE comparisons to examine whether forecasting out-of-sample exchange rate 
returns with order flow outperforms the random walk model (using future realized values 
of order flow) and find strong evidence in favor of the order-flow model.40   
Our results so far suggest that news, broadly defined, influences exchange rate 
returns and volatility, and that order flow influences returns.  The next question to ask is 
what drives order flow?  Previous studies have found a link between macro surprises and 
order flow, which runs counter to standard models that would suggest that common 
knowledge news, such as macro surprises, should be instantly incorporated in price.  We 
test whether this result also holds for our data sample, and whether our broader definition 
of news is also linked to order flow, OF.  
1, 2,i i
k k
k j j ti j g g ti gt t0  =  + N OF + OF γ γγ ν− −∑ ∑ + ∑   (5) 
                                                 
38 Recent papers that have studied the link between “news” and order flow are Love (2004), Love and 
Payne (2003), Melvin and Yin (2000), and Evans and Lyons (2003, 2004, and 2005a). Breedon and Vitale 
(2005) examine the connection between order flow and liquidity risk. 
39 Danielsson, Payne and Luo (2002) compare the 2R for this sort of regression over multiple sampling 
frequencies (from 5 minutes to one week) and find that for the USD-EUR rate the percent variation is fairly 
stable (around 40%) over all frequencies. 
40 However, when Danielsson et al (2002) only use order flow information available at the forecast date, the 
RMSE of the order flow forecast model falls below the RMSE for the random walk model.  Using 
disaggregated order flow information over a longer horizon (10 days or longer) Evans and Lyons (2005b) 
find that the forecasting ability of their order flow model is significantly better than the random walk 
model. 
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Table 11 presents results for the regression of USD-EUR and USD-GBP order 
flow on various categories of news. The first and third columns provide results for our 
benchmark specification which only includes the macro surprises.  European macro 
surprises are highly statistically significant for USD-EUR order flow but none of the 
macro surprises are significant in the USD-GBP order flow regression. The results in the 
second and fourth columns indicate that many of the non-scheduled fundamental and 
non-fundamental related news enter significantly for both currencies.  However,  “news” 
explains a relatively small fraction of the overall variation in order flow.  Our regression 
goodness-of-fit measure never rises above 0.05 for either currency, indicating that our 
measure of order flow is largely not being driven by our measures of “news”.41  
However, if we allow for interaction effects as we did previously in our returns 
regression, we find stronger evidence of a relationship between “news” and order flow.  
This is particularly true when we interact “news” with “high volatility” periods, where 
the regression goodness-of-fit rises to 0.14 for USD-EUR order flow and 0.13 for USD-
GBP order flow. 
 
6. VAR Analysis  
In the previous section we analyzed the relationships between returns (or 
volatility), order flow and various categories of news using single equation methods.  It is 
probably more appropriate, however, to think of these variables as part of an interrelated 
economic system.  News hits the market and influences trader expectations, which in turn 
impacts prices (and returns), volume, and order flow.42  It is also clear that order flow 
(imbalances in buy and sell orders) influence returns.  This suggests the following two-
equation system: 
                                                 
41 This result is at odds with results in Evans and Lyons (2004) which find a strong connection between 
disaggregated order flow and news.  It is possible that the difference in results is due to the fact that our 
order flow information is only reflecting inter-dealer trades. 
42 In standard macro models “news” should only influence prices and volume, not order flow.  However, 
our single equation results strongly suggest that the influence of news is, at least in part, mediated through 
order flow, as well as directly affecting prices.  Previous work by Evans and Lyons (2003) has attempted to 
disentangle the effects of news on prices and order flow by assuming that (common-knowledge) news is 
orthogonal to (dispersed information) order flow.  Our approach is to assume that news influences both 
prices and order flow and focus more on the total influence of news – rather than attempting to disentangle 
its separate effects. 
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2, 3,i i j i g i k
k k
0 1, jk j g gg k tt t t t  =  +  + OFs N sα α iα α ε− − −+ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∆ ∆   (6) 
2, 3,1, i g ii ki j
kk
k j g gti g k tt tj0 t
OF   =  +  + OFN sβ βββ ν− −− + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∆  
Our identifying assumption is that order flow does not depend on 
contemporaneous returns, so that β2,0=0.  This assumption is not innocuous.  If returns are 
mean-reverting, feedback trading would be profitable and would in turn lead returns to 
influence order flow.   
  VAR regression results indicate that order flow enters with a very high degree of 
statistical significance in the returns regression, as was true in our single equation 
estimates.  An increase in USD-EUR order flow (an increase in net purchases of euros) 
leads on average to an increase in the USD-EUR rate (an euro appreciation relative to the 
dollar) of 0.4 basis points.  Similarly, in the USD-GBP market an increase in net 
purchases of pounds leads, on average, to a 0.3 basis point appreciation of the pound 
relative to the dollar.  While it is clear that most of the explanatory power in the returns 
regression is coming from order flow, “news” and especially non-scheduled “news”, 
continues to also matter.  Or, put another way, the inclusion of order flow does not wipe 
out the influence of “news”. Likewise, all three types of “news” enter significantly in the 
order flow equations.  Figures 6 and 7 present examples of the intra-day impulse 
responses of returns and order flow to “news”. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the role of news in exchange rate determination.  
Previous studies have found that scheduled macro announcements, when measured in 
surprise form, help to explain intra-daily exchange rate behavior.  These results, in turn, 
have breathed new life into the post Meese-Rogoff empirical exchange rate literature. We 
measure news much more broadly, and include both fundamentals-related and non-
fundamentals-related news reports to examine whether it is macro announcements, or 
simply intra-daily data (and a more “narrow window”), that accounts for these positive 
results. Overall, our results do not suggest that our broader definition of news provides a 
vast improvement over the macro surprises in explaining exchange rate behavior, giving 
yet more credence to the importance of macro variables in standard models.  We do, 
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however, find that non-scheduled news, and intriguingly, non-scheduled non-
fundamentals-related news has a statistically significant influence on both intra-day 
exchange rate returns and volatility.  Further, we find that news has its largest impact 
during periods of higher than normal news arrival and higher market uncertainty. 
 We also examine the role of order flow in exchange rate determination.  In 
standard models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to news because price 
is assumed to instantaneously adjust.  Trading volume may rise in reaction to news, but 
as long as the new price is efficient, there is no reason for trades to be biased in favor of 
purchases or sales.  We find that order flow explains a large fraction of the variation in 
both USD-EUR and USD-GBP exchange rate returns, suggesting that prices are, at the 
very least, slow to adjust. At the same time, we find that our measure of “news” explains 
a relatively small fraction of the total variation in order flow.  Overall, our results indicate 
that along with the standard fundamentals, both non-fundamentals-related news and order 
flow matter, suggesting that future models of exchange rate determination ought to 
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1a. USD-EUR Bid & Ask Quotes 1b. USD-EUR Mid Quote
2a. USD-GBP Bid & Ask Quotes 2b. USD-GBP Mid Quote
Figure 1: Reuters D2000-2 USD-EUR and USD-GBP Bid, Ask and Mid Quotes
Notes:  The data cover the ten month period from 06  Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000.    Both currencies are 
defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively).  The mid quote is 




























































































































































Notes:  The data cover the ten month period from 06  Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000.  Order flow is the 
net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a 











































































































































































































































































































































1a. USD-EUR Return 1b. USD-EUR Volatility
2a. USD-GBP Return 2b. USD-GBP Volatility
Figure 3: Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility
(in basis points)
Notes: The data cover the ten month period from 06  Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000 and are sampled at 20-
minute frequency.  Both currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and 
sterling, respectively).  Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid 

































































































































































































Figure 4: Average Daily Volatility and FFF Seasonal
(in basis points)
Notes: The data cover the ten month period from 06 Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000 
and are sampled at 20-minute frequency.  Both currencies are defined as the 
number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively).  The 
figures plot the average intra-daily pattern of volatility (jagged line) and the 
Flexible Fourier Form seasonal (smooth line) over a 24-hour period.  Volatility 
is defined as the absolute return, where returns are calculated as 100 times 
the log difference of the mid quote.  The mid quote is calculated as the 
































































































Notes: The data cover the ten month period from 06 Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000 and are sampled at 
20-min frequency.  Both currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency (
and sterling, respectively).  The figures plot the average intra-daily pattern of returns, order fl
and news arrival over a 24-hour period.  Returns are calculated as 100 times the log differenc
the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  Or
flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the 
initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR and sterling fo
USD-GBP).  News Arrival is the number of Reuters news articles in each 20- min period.
Figure 5: Average Daily Returns, Order Flow and News Arrival
USD-EUR USD-GBP




































































































































































































































   










Note: These figures show the cumulative effects of order flow (up to two hours after) and examples of 
fundamental and non-fundamental "news" (two hours before and two hours after) on returns (where the Reuters 
news report occurs at time 0). The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6: Intra-day Effects of Order Flow and News on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns
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Figure 7: Intra-day Effects of News on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Order Flow
Note: These figures show the cumulative effects of two examples of fundamental and non-fundamental "news" 
(two hours before and two hours after) on order flow (where the Reuters news report occurs at time 0). The 
dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval.
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Announcement Reported as Local time
UK Announcements (total = 80)
RPIX Y/Y % change 08:30 GMT
Retail Sales M/M % change 08:30 GMT
Global trade GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
Provisional M4 M/M % change 08:30 GMT
PPI M/M % change NSA 08:30 GMT
Industrial Production M/M % change 08:30 GMT
Unemployment thousands 08:30 GMT
Current Account GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
US Announcements (total = 80)
PPI M/M % change 08:30 ET
CPI M/M % change 08:30 ET
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Macro News Announcements
ers to 
 change.  
 
Industrial Production M/M % change 09:15 ET
Monthly M3 change $ (billion) 16:30 ET
Goods & Services Trade Balance USD (billion) 08:30 ET
Civilian Unemployment Rate percent 08:30 ET
Nonfarm Payrolls thousands 08:30 ET
Retail Sales M/M % change 08:30 ET
Euro Area Announcements (total = 58)
PPI M/M % change 11:00 GMT
Harmonised CPI M/M % change 11:00 GMT
Ind Production 3M/3M % change 11:00 GMT
M3 Y/Y % change 09:00 GMT
Trade ex-EMU prel. EUR EUR (billion) 11:00 GMT
Unemployment rate percent 11:00 GMT
Notes: The data cover the ten month period from 06  Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000.  M/M% change ref
month-on-month percentage change.  3M/3M% change is three month-on-three month percentage
Y/Y% change is year-on-year percentage change.  NSA refers to non-seasonally adjusted.
 
Monetary Fundamentals Fiscal Fundamentals Growth and Unemployment
Exchange Rate Policy 
Fundamentals
inflation (rise/fall) trade (surplus/deficit) growth (positive/negative) exchange rate target
interest rates (rise/fall) fiscal position (good/bad) unemployment (good/bad) intervention
bias (loosening/tightening) real effective exchange rate Intervention (potential weapon)







Table 2: Broad Categories of Non-Scheduled Fundamental-Related News
 
 
Options Market Technical Analysis Market Characteristics Market Sentiment Private Sector
options market (support/no support) technical factors (good/bad) year end europe (pos/neg) restructuring good/bad news
demand for barrier options (up/down) technical magnetism of parity month end US (pos/neg) government intvn in corporate sector
market for current contracts (thin/liquid) window dressing Y2K Holzman
trading (at/below) par exposure driven trading thin/concentrated markets M&A
lack of momentum risks from large orders Mannesman-Orange
institutional selling aggressive selling (curbed) Vodafone-Mannesman
stop-loss selling/orders executed Coca-Cola-Orangina
investors/traders cut losses Novartis-AstraZeneca
long positions (opened/closed) Banking M&A
trading (choppy, lively, jittery) attempts to block M&A
exchange rate volatility (up/down) speculation about flows due to M&A
spreads (wider/narrower) deals (more/large)
Table 3: Broad Categories of Non-Scheduled Non-Fundamental-Related News
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Source: Rime (2003, page 485). This screen shows the Reuters Dealing 2000 system. The middle section contains the D2000-1 system for direct bilateral 
trading, and the top section is the D2000-2 electronic broker. The dealer chooses which exchange rates to display and whether to display the best prices in the 
market (column marked best) and/or the best available to him (from credit-approved banks only). In the D2000-1 section the dealer has been contacted for a 
quote for USD 4 million against DEM. The dealer replies with the quote “05 08”, which is understood to be bid 1.8305 and ask 1.8308. The contacting 
dealer responds with “I BUY,” and the system automatically fills in the line “TO CONFIRM AT 1.8308. . .”.  In the lower right corner of the screen, the 
dealer can see the price and direction of the last trades through the D2000-2 system.














Mean 0.98 0.14 6.08 0.33 1.22 32.90
Variance 0.05 11.27 9.49 13.55 1.76 54.09
Skewness 0.25 0.23 3.53 0.50 1.84 2.13
Kurtosis 2.40 16.24 20.64 15.85 9.72 9.76
Autocorrelation lags
1 0.99 0.26 0.51 0.04 0.86 0.85
5 0.99 0.04 0.24 0.02 0.60 0.54
10 0.98 -0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.35 0.29












Mean 1.58 -0.04 3.51 0.81 1.33 38.52
Variance 0.05 5.71 4.50 10.39 1.34 53.96
Skewness -0.42 0.09 2.57 0.66 1.27 2.30
Kurtosis 1.99 9.25 11.91 10.78 4.65 10.23
Autocorrelation lags
1 1.00 -0.02 0.33 0.02 0.80 0.80
5 1.00 -0.01 0.20 0.02 0.57 0.52
10 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.37 0.30
20 1.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.02
Table 5: Summary Statistics for USD-EUR and USD-GBP Quotes, 
Returns, Volatility, Order Flow and Transaction Frequency
Notes: The data cover the ten month period from 06 Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000 and 
are sampled at 20-minute frequency.  Both currencies are defined as the number of 
dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively).  The mid quote is 
calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  Returns are defined as 100 
times the log difference of the mid quote.  Volatility is defined as the absolute return.  
Order flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a 
trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro 
for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-GBP).  Order flow volatility is the standard 
deviation of order flow. Transaction frequency is the number of transactions in the 20-
minute period.















Return 1 … … … … …
Volatility 0.055 1 … … … …
Order Flow 0.451 0.007 1 … … …
Order Flow Volatility -0.027 0.233 0.034 1 … …
Transaction Frequency -0.019 0.248 0.063 0.956 1 …













Return 1 … … … … …
Volatility 0.005 1 … … … …
Order Flow 0.471 0.073 1 … … …
Order Flow Volatility -0.030 0.506 0.084 1 … …
Transaction Frequency -0.025 0.534 0.112 0.923 1 …
Reuters News Arrival -0.004 -0.018 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 1
Notes: The data cover the ten month period from 06 Oct 1999 to 24 July 2000 and are 
sampled at 20-minute frequency.  Both currencies are defined as the number of 
dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively).  Returns are defined as 
100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the 
average of the bid and ask quotes.  Volatility is defined as the absolute return.  Order 
flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in 
which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-
EUR and sterling for USD-GBP). Order flow volatility is the standard deviation of order 
flow. Transaction frequency is the number of transactions in each 20-minute period 
and Reuters News Arrival is the number of news articles in each 20 minute period.
Table 6: Contemporaneous Correlations Between Returns, 











… … … … … … … …
0.2693 *** 0.2562 *** -0.1159 *** -0.1365 ***
0.1813 *** 0.1673 ** … … … …
… … … … 0.0292 * 0.0331 **
US … … … … … … … …
-0.0329 *** … … -0.0441 *** -0.0222 **
-0.0221 * … …
-0.0111 * … …
… … 0.0125 *
… … 0.0203 **
… … -0.0116 *
… … 0.0241 *
-0.0403 * … …
… … -0.0240 **
… … 0.0234 **
0.0385 ** … …
-0.0253 * -0.0130 *
… … -0.0125 **
… … 0.0384 **
-0.0479 ** … …
… … 0.0134 *
-0.0246 ** … …
-0.0713 ** -0.0287 *
… … -0.0058 *
-0.0240 ** … …
… … 0.0112 **







































Euro-zone lags 2-6 … … 0.0233 ***
US leads 2-6 … … 0.0455 ***
US lead 1 … … 0.0555 ***
US lag 1 -0.0330 *** … …
Private Sector
lags 2-6 … … -0.0058 ***
Politics
lead 1 … … 0.0266 *
contemporaneous -0.0439 * … …
R-squared 0.1374 0.1478 0.0156 0.061
Rbar-squared 0.1360 0.1168 0.0140 0.027
1. This category of news includes growth, unemployment, and the real effective exchange rate.
Table 7: The Influence of "News" on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns
Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote 
where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 
5 and 1 percent levels respectively and "…" indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.  For each regressor the sum of 
leads 2-6, lead 1, contemporaneous, lag 1 and the sum of lags 2-6 are included in the regression but for reasons of 






lag 1 0.2557 *** -0.1359 *** 0.1592 ** -0.1196




UK … … 0.0331 ** … … 0.0336 **
US … … … … … …
Euro-zone … … … … … … -0.0226
Monetary Fundamentals
Euro-zone contemporaneous -0.0263 * … … -0.0183 * …
Euro-zone lags 2-6 … … … … … … 0.0053
US leads 2-6 … … … … -0.0087 ** …
US lag 1 … … … … … … 0.0103
US lags 2-6 … … … … 0.0050 * …
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone lead 1 … … 0.0211 ** 0.0240 * 0.0216
Japan leads 2-6 … … 0.0115 ** … … …
Japan lag 1 0.0697 * … … … … …
Fiscal Fundamentals
Euro-zone lead 1 … … … … … … -0.0152
US leads 2-6 … … … … -0.0184 * …
US lag 1 … … … … 0.0435 ** …
US lags 2-6 … … -0.0222 ** -0.0224 * -0.0267
Exchange Rate Policy Fundamentals
US leads 2-6 … … 0.0196 ** … … 0.0141
US lag 1 … … … … -0.0503 ** -0.0433
Japan contemporaneous 0.0350 ** … … … … …
Japan lag 1 -0.0253 * -0.0128 * … … -0.0124
Actual Intervention
Japan leads 2-6 … … -0.0121 ** … … -0.0069
Japan lead 1 … … 0.0385 * 0.0303 ** 0.0160
Japan contemporaneous -0.0642 * … … -0.0347 * …
Japan lags 2-6 … … … … … … -0.0064
Other Macro Fundamentals1 
Euro-zone leads 2-6 … … … … -0.0071 * …
Euro-zone contemporaneous … … 0.0144 ** … … …
Euro-zone lag 1 … … … … … … 0.0133
US lag 1 -0.0311 ** … … … … …
US lags 2-6 … … … … … … -0.0036
Japan contemporaneous … … -0.0879 *** … … …
Japan lag 1 … … -0.0303 ** … … …
(contd.)
Table 8: The Influence of "News" on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns in "High News
Arrival" and "High Volatility" Periods
"High News Arrival" "High Volatility"





































leads 2-6 … … -0.0052 * … … -0.0052 *
lag 1 -0.0421 *** … … -0.0192 * … …
lags 2-6 … … 0.0142 *** 0.0069 * … …
Market Sentiment
Euro-zone lags 2-6 … … 0.0258 *** … … … …
US leads 2-6 … … 0.0500 *** 0.0340 ** 0.0267 ***
US lead 1 … … -0.1420 * … … 0.0428 ***
US contemporaneous -0.8874 * -1.0732 *** -0.0419 * … …
US lag 1 -0.0337 *** … … -0.0474 *** … …
Private Sector
lead 1 … … … … … … -0.0157 ***
contemporaneous … … -0.0077 * … … -0.0083 **
lags 2-6 … … -0.0053 ** … … -0.0056 ***
Politics
leads 2-6 … … … … 0.0223 * … …
lead 1 … … 0.0281 * … … 0.0402 ***
contemporaneous -0.0676 ** … … -0.0538 ** … …
Interaction Terms
Monetary Fundamentals
US leads 2-6 … … … … 0.9797 *** … …
US lags 2-6 … … … … -0.1100 *** … …
Other Asset Markets
Japan leads 2-6 … … -0.1767 *** 0.2342 *** … …
Japan lag 1 -0.8273 *** -0.7267 *** 0.3322 ***
Fiscal Fundamentals
US lags 2-6 … … … … -0.5274 * 0.3910 ***
Exchange Rate Policy Fundamentals
Actual Intervention
Japan lead 1 0.0458 ** 0.5289 *** 0.3010 ***
Other Macro Fundamentals1 
Euro-zone leads 2-6 … … … … 0.4087 *** … …
Non-Fundamentals
Options Market 
lags 2-6 … … -0.0591 ** … … 0.0779 *
R-squared 0.1627 0.0814 0.3156 0.2117
Rbar-squared 0.1150 0.0293 0.2833 0.1716
1. This category of news includes growth, unemployment, and the real effective exchange rate.
"High Volatility"
USD-EUR USD-GBP USD-EUR USD-GBP
Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times the log difference of the 
mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  *, ** and *** represent 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively and "…" indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.  For 
each regressor the sum of leads 2-6, lead 1, contemporaneous, lag 1 and the sum of lags 2-6 are included in 
the regression but for reasons of space only the significant coefficients are reported. "High News Arrival" is an 
indicator variable which takes the value 1 during 20-min intervals when the number of news reports exceeds 
the sample average by two standard deviations. "High Volatility" is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 
during 20-min intervals when volatility exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations.
"High News Arrival"
Table 8: The Influence of "News" on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns in "High News 





Constant -0.0035 * -0.0042 ** -0.0033 *** -0.0042 ***
Lagged Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.4674 *** 0.4604 *** 0.2181 *** 0.2023 ***
lag 2 0.0903 * 0.0877 * 0.1308 *** 0.1219 ***
lag 3 0.0971 *** 0.0958 *** 0.0486 ** 0.0421 *
lag 4 0.0586 ** 0.0552 ** 0.0943 *** 0.0943 ***
lag 5 … … … … 0.0518 * 0.0477 *
lag 6 … … … … 0.0528 * 0.0525 *
Macro Surprises
UK … … … … … … … …
US … … … … -0.0376 *** -0.0379 ***
Euro-zone … … … … … … … …
Monetary Fundamentals
US lags 2-6 … … 0.0039 *
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 … … 0.0067 *
US lag 1 … … 0.0108 **
Japan leads 2-6 … … -0.0115 ***
Japan lag 1 … … -0.0130 *
Fiscal Fundamentals
Euro-zone leads 2-6 … … -0.0105 **
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0365 *** … …
Euro-zone lags 2-6 … … -0.0110 **
US lead 1 -0.0442 ** -0.0196 **
US contemporaneous … … 0.0254 *
Exchange Rate Policy Fundamentals
Euro-zone lags 2-6 … … 0.0056 ***
US leads 2-6 … … -0.0133 *
Japan lag 1 … … -0.0081 **
Japan lags 2-6 … … -0.0044 **
Other Macro Fundamentals1 
Euro-zone contemporaneous -0.0118 ** … …
US lag 1 -0.0159 ** … …
US lags 2-6 … … -0.0045 **
Non-Fundamentals
Options Market 
leads 2-6 … … -0.0058 *
contemporaneous 0.0106 ** … …
lag 1 0.0106 * -0.0061 **
Technical Analysis
contemporaneous -0.0147 * … …
Market Sentiment
Euro-zone lead 1 … … -0.0240 **
US leads 2-6 0.0336 * 0.0102 *
US lead 1 -0.0674 *** … …
US contemporaneous -0.0451 ** -0.0487 ***
US lag 1 0.0221 ** -0.0138 **
US lags 2-6 … … 0.0132 *
Private Sector
leads 2-6 … … -0.0029 **
lead 1 … … 0.0057 **
contemporaneous … … 0.0053 *
Politics
contemporaneous … … -0.0199 **







Rbar-squared 0.3853 0.3628 0.1503 0.154
1. This category of news includes growth, unemployment, and the real effective exchange rate.
Notes: Volatility is calculated at 20 minute frequency and is defined as the absolute return where returns are calculated as 
100 times the log difference of the mid quote .The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  *, ** 
and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively and "…" indicates that the coefficient is 
insignificant.  For each regressor the sum of leads 2-6, lead 1, contemporaneous, lag 1 and the sum of lags 2-6 are 
included in the regression but for reasons of space only the significant coefficients are reported.





Constant … … -0.0022 ***
Lagged Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.3765 *** … …
lag 2 0.1422 *** … …
Order Flow
Contemporaneous 0.0041 *** 0.0028 ***
lag1 -0.0019 *** -0.0003 *
lags 2-6 … … … …
R-squared 0.3906 0.2614
Rbar-squared 0.3895 0.2601
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency.  
Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote .The 
mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  Order 
flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a 
trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator 
currency (euro for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-GBP).  *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively and "…" 
indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.  For each regressor the sum of 
leads 2-6, lead 1, contemporaneous, lag 1 and the sum of lags 2-6 are 
included in the regression but for reasons of space only the significant 
coefficients are reported.

















































a trade in 






lag 2 … … … … 0.0612 **
Macro Surprises
UK … … … … … …
US … … … … … …
Euro-zone -14.3592 *** -8.1623 *** … …
Monetary Fundamentals
Euro-zone lead 1 -4.6384 **
Euro-zone lag 1 … … -
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -2.0149 * -
US lags 2-6 1.1211 **
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 … … -
Euro-zone lead 1 8.5026 ***
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -2.6458 *
US lead 1 … … 2
Japan lead 1 -8.4890 ***
Fiscal Fundamentals
Euro-zone lead 1 -6.1345 *
US leads 2-6 -3.6302 *
US lag 1 … … 6
Exchange Rate Policy Fundamentals
Euro-zone lead 1 2.2783 * 1
Euro-zone contemporaneous … …
Euro-zone lags 2-6 … … 1
US leads 2-6 … … 5
US lags 2-6 -6.6751 * -
Japan lags 2-6 … … -
Other Macro Fundamentals1 
Euro-zone lag 1 … … 2
Non-Fundamentals
Options Market 
leads 2-6 … … -
lags 2-6 1.8932 *
Technical Analysis
lags 2-6 -1.1253 *
Market Sentiment
Euro-zone lags 2-6 4.4319 **
US leads 2-6 8.2922 ***
US lead 1 18.1050 ***
US lag 1 13.0734 ***
US lags 2-6 … … 3
Private Sector
lags 2-6 … … -
Politics
leads 2-6 3.3832 *
lag 1 -5.8603 **
R-squared 0.0037 0.0547 0.0065
Rbar-squared 0.0020 0.0203 0.0048
1. This category of news includes growth, unemployment, and the real effective exchange rate.
Notes: Order flows are the net of the total buys and total sells at 20 minute frequency, where a buy (sell) refers to 
which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-G
and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively and "…" indicates that the coefficient is i
For each regressor the sum of leads 2-6, lead 1, contemporaneous, lag 1 and the sum of lags 2-6 are included in
regression but for reasons of space only the significant coefficients are reported.
Table 11: The Influence of "News" on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Order Flow
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benc
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